Over the years I have had numerous legal disagreements with the Information Commissioner. It may therefore seem surprising that I have enormous respect for the essential work the regulator does to help us all hold public authorities to account over how they spend our money. The single most common reason government agencies give to withhold information is disclosure might prejudice service providers’ commercial interests. The outcome of this appeal might make it harder in future for public to use that as an excuse to avoid openness and transparency. Although the judicial process is adversarial, I’m hopeful we have some common ground with the Commissioner. To explain why, I first need to set the scene.
Special Educational Needs and Disability (SEND)
By law, local authorities must issue Education and Health Care Plans (EHCPs) within 20 weeks. A rapid rise in demand has left councils across the country struggling to meet these statutory targets. Last month the government published its white paper aimed at wider reforms: Special Educational Needs and Disability (SEND) Reform.

Government statistics show that in 2020 Leeds Council’s compliancy with the statutory 20-week period was 88.8%. By 2024 this figure had dropped to 9.3%. The council paid Price Waterhouse Cooper (PwC) £749,000 in management consultancy fees to produce a report on how they could improve compliancy. It may have been better for Leeds to spend this money directly supporting children. We don’t know because the council refused to disclose the report. The parents who gave up their time and emotional capital to contribute the essential input PwC needed to produce their report did so in the expectation that the council would disclose it and use this to drive systemic improvements for others.
Leeds argued that other councils would be less likely to ask PwC to provide management consultancy on how to meet their statutory SEND obligations if this information was already in the public domain. The Information Commissioner upheld their decision. Mr Khan, who originally requested disclosure, appealed to the First Tier Tribunal. The Tribunal does its best to support “litigants in person”. However, speaking from personal experience, the process can be terrifying and few people know how to present a legal argument. I learnt through trial and error. Mainly the latter. Representation can make a huge difference, but legal advice is expensive. Victorian Court of Appeal Judge, Lord Mathew, quipped, “In England justice is open to all, like the Ritz hotel.” That observation has stood the test of time.
I am by no means qualified but have some past successes such as my challenge to former immigration minister Robert Jenrick’s decision that the Home Office should withhold a report into the historic roots of the Windrush scandal. The ensuing appeal resulted in the judge comparing the government’s attempts to control information to Orwell’s 1984, a reiteration of Santayana’s warning that, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it“, and some coverage in the Guardian.
Philosophically, my position is the neoliberal prioritisation of commercial interests damages public services such as health care, education, and social welfare, increases inequality, and reduces democratic accountability. For an example, look no further than the privatisation of water companies. The claimed commercial prejudice in this appeal is based on entirely speculative, future earnings. A more cynical interpretation is that disclosure would prevent PwC from reselling the same old bit of rope they had already been given three quarters of a million pounds of public money for. To even begin to address the issues with SEND provision, the first essential step is for Leeds council to disclose this report. For that reason, I agreed to represent Mr Khan.
Freedom of Information
The way the Freedom of Information Act works is public authorities must disclose requested information unless one or more “exemptions” applies. These can be “absolute” or “qualified”. A request from the Kremlin to disclose the location of the UK’s submarines would rightly be refused under s.24 to safeguard national security. That exemption is absolute. However, the exemption used by public authorities to refuse disclosure more than any others is s.43(2) – prejudice to commercial interests. This is qualified meaning the public authority must consider not just the commercial interests but also whether the wider public interest lies in disclosure.
We conceded a hypothetical possibility that PwC could profit from charging other councils for management consultancy which Leeds council had already fully reimbursed them for, but maintained the public interest in improving support for vulnerable children far outweighed that. We lost. The First Tier Tribunal concluded that disclosure would place additional financial burden on the council. This was unexpected as the council’s financial interests are entirely separate to PwC’s commercial interests which the council’s refusal was based on.
Appealing to the Upper Tribunal
There is a high bar to obtaining permission to appeal any court decision. The appellant must demonstrate that the lower court “erred in law” and this had a material impact on the outcome. The court’s permission on whether an appeal can precede or not is binary, but the way they word it can be informative. The Upper Tribunal granted permission to appeal on all the six grounds submitted putting the onus very much on the Information Commissioner to argue why Leeds council should continue to withhold the information. Within those grounds I make three submissions on the interpretation of the law.
The first relates to how public authorities should apply the public interest test. Specifically, we submit that when Parliament drafted the Freedom of Information Act, they produced a finite list of all the valid reasons for withholding information. It follows that any arguments for withholding information must specifically relate to the claimed exemption. To put that in the context of this appeal, the First Tier Tribunal concluded that disclosure would prejudice PwC’s commercial interests but in their balancing the arguments they considered the financial impact on Leeds council. The “orthodox” position taken by several First Tier Tribunals is that public interest arguments in favour of withholding information must specifically relate to the exemption, although these decisions are not legally binding on others.
The second relates to whether the council’s interests are commercial or financial. Here we relied on the Court of Appeal decision (Department for Work and Pensions v Information Commissioner and Zola [2016] EWCA Civ 758). The CoA rejected the DWP’s argument that any additional costs in providing public services they might incur due to disclosure would be “commercial”. This may seem pedantic, but there is no exemption in the legislation covering financial prejudice. The decision by Judge Harris which we are appealing states, “The authority relied on appears to be simply legal argument which was not accepted by the judge in that case.” We respectfully disagree.
The third point relates to something called the public interest timing point. The courts have confirmed public authorities must consider the public interest needs at the point in time they refuse to disclose information. Over seven hundred and fifty people have signed a petition asking the council to disclose the report. The Tribunal rejected this evidence because it postdated the council’s refusal. It is hard to imagine how parents would sign a petition protesting about a decision they consider negatively impacts them before the council made it! In granting permission to appeal, Upper Tribunal Judge Stout pointed out this was, “evidence of actual public interest in its release at the time of the request, even if that interest was not expressed until after the date of the Council’s decision.”
Conclusion
After Judge Stout granted permission to appeal I wrote to the Information Commissioner asking to what extent we could agree on the three points described above. Agreeing on the law does not prevent the Commissioner arguing the facts of this case warrant Leeds continuing to withhold the information. I am confident we should find common ground because my arguments are all derived from the excellent guidance the Commissioner publishes on his website. He in turn bases his guidance on his detailed analysis of past judicial decisions. The one drawback with the ICO guidance is often the only available precedents are First Tier Tribunal rulings which are not legally binding. Any agreement we can reach will:
- Reduce the burden on the Upper Tribunal.
- Enable the Commissioner to modify his guidance on these specific points of law so it is based on a legally binding ruling.
- Help us to argue that Leeds council should publish this crucial report.
The Information Commissioner’s response to the appeal was initially due 9 April. I am encouraged that he has requested an additional month to seek counsel before responding to my request that try to “agree on what we agree on“.
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